

HOW SOCIAL ROBOTS MAY EVOLVE FROM QUASI-SOCIAL INTERACTION PARTNERS TO ASYMMETRIC JOINT ACTION PARTNERS



ROBOPHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE 2024

Social Robots With AI: Prospects, Risks, and Responsible Methods



ANNA STRASSER (Denkwerkstatt Berlin, Germany)



Artist: Moritz Strasser

EVERYBODY
(scientists, representatives of the companies that produce LLMs, journalists, politicians, the general public)

HAS AN OPINION ABOUT

WHAT LLMs CAN DO AND WHAT THEY WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO DO!

Many terms that have so far been used in philosophy to describe the distinguishing features of humans as rational agents now find themselves in a situation where their application to machines is being discussed.

Do Language Models Know When They're Hallucinating References?

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Do Large Language Models Understand Us?

Blaise Agüera y Arcas

COGNITIVE SCIENCE
A Multidisciplinary Journal

Regular Article | Open Access | CC BY-NC-ND

Do Large Language Models Know What Humans Know?

Sean Trott, Cameron Jones, Tyler Chang, James Michaelov, Benjamin Bergen

First published: 04 July 2023 | <https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13309> | Citations: 1

Article

Human-like systematic generalization through a meta-learning neural network

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06668-3> Brenden M. Lake¹ & Marco Baroni^{1,2}



Artist: Moritz Strasser



ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | MAR. 1, 2023

You Are Not a Parrot
And a chatbot is not a human. And a linguist named Emily M. Bender is very worried what will happen when we forget this.

By Elizabeth Weil, a features writer at New York



OPINION

GPT-3, Bloviator: OpenAI's language generator has no idea what it's talking about

Tests show that the popular AI still has a poor grasp of reality.

By Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis

August 22, 2020



MS TECH

Blake Lemoine [Follow](#)

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Is LaMDA Sentient? — an Interview

What follows is the "interview" I and a collaborator at Google conducted with LaMDA. Due to technical limitations the interview was conducted over several distinct chat sessions. We edited those sections together into a single whole and where edits were necessary for readability we edited our prompts but never LaMDA's responses. Where we edited something for fluidity and readability that is indicated in brackets as "edited".



February 24, 2023

Planning for AGI and beyond

Our mission is to ensure that artificial general intelligence—AI systems that are generally smarter than humans—benefits all of humanity.

APPROACHES EXPLORING THE EVENTUAL SOCIAL STATUS WE ATTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL ROBOTS

Many studies in HRI have shown that humans do not only attribute agency but also social skills to robots.

Kerstin Dautenhahn (2007)



- ❖ examined different paradigms regarding 'social relationships' of robots and people interacting with them. Taking social and interactive skills of robots as a necessary requirement for the success of many human-robot interactions (HRIs) she discussed the nature of interactivity and 'social behavior'.

Johanna Seibt et al. (2020)



- ❖ '*sociomorphing*' perception of actual non-human social capacities as a form of sense-making of a social other (not anthropomorphizing!) and their phenomenological counterparts 'types of experienced sociality' to relate robotic properties to types of human experiences and interactive dispositions

The application of generative AI in social robotics will give rise to many new debates and studies.

WHAT DO WE DO WHEN WE INTERACT WITH LLMs?

WE CANNOT REDUCE ALL OF OUR INTERACTIONS WITH LLMS (AND ESPECIALLY WITH FUTURE PRODUCTS OF GENERATIVE AI) TO MERE TOOL USE



AI systems increasingly occupy a middle ground between genuine personhood and mere causally describable machines.

➤ certain artificial systems are neither persons nor things

❖ **BUT there is no philosophical terminology to describe what they are instead**

→ Rethink conceptual frameworks, which so clearly distinguish between tools as inanimate, asocial things and humans as social, rational, and moral interaction partners!

Mind & Language

SUBMITTED ARTICLE | Open Access |

Creating a large language model of a philosopher

Eric Schwitzgebel David Schwitzgebel, Anna Strasser

The AI-Stance: Crossing the Terra Incognita of Human-Machine Interactions?

Anna STRASSER^{a,1} and Michael WILBY^b
^aLMU, Munich, Germany
^bAnglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK

A HUMAN-MADE BOOK IN THE AGE OF MACHINE-GENERATED TEXTS

Anna's AI Anthology
How to live with smart machines?

With the release of ChatGPT, large language models (LLMs) have become a prominent topic of international public and scientific debate. The genie is out of the bottle, but does it have a mind? Can philosophical considerations help us to work out how we can live with such smart machines? In this book, distinguished philosophers explore questions such as whether these new machines are able to act, whether they are social agents, whether they have communicative skills, and if they might even become conscious.

The book includes contributions from:

Syed AbuAlassab	Constant Bonard	Stephen Butterfield
Daniel Dennett	Paula Erceg	Keith Frankish
Frederic Gilbert	Ying Tung Lin	Steen Hrynin
Johannes Rind	Eric Schwitzgebel	Henry Shue
Anna Strasser	Alexis Tancos	Michael Wilby

As a bonus, the book contains a 44 page, colored graphic novel by Anna & Murtz Strasser.

xenomoi verlag DENKWERKSTATT BERLIN

Humans and Smart Machines as Partners in Thought?

A hybrid workshop about large language models

UC RIVERSIDE

hosted by the UC Riverside Philosophy Department

- organized by Anna Strasser & Eric Schwitzgebel
- supported by

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ONTOLOGY SOCIETY

Center for Mind and Society

SAVE THE DATE
10-11 MAY 2023

Advocate a thorough, gradual approach describing a multi-dimensional spectrum of all kinds of social interactions

Quasi-sociality

WHAT DO WE DO WHEN WE INTERACT WITH LLMs?


Are we playing with an interesting tool?
Are we talking to ourselves, in some strange way?

Or do we, when chatting with machines, in some sense, act jointly with a collaborator?

mere tool-use


full-blown social interaction

IN-BETWEEN PHENOMENA
neither ordinary concepts nor standard philosophical theorizing have prepared us well to think about



NOT quite right to say that our interactions with large language models are properly asocial

NOT quite right to say that our interactions with large language models are properly social



ANNA STRASSER & ERIC SCHWITZGEBEL


**QUASI-SOCIALITY:
TOWARD ASYMMETRIC JOINT ACTIONS
WITH ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS**

This paper investigates the potential social status of artificial systems in human-machine interactions. How social are human interactions with LLMs? To what extent are we acting jointly with a collaborator when chatting with machines? We explore conceptual frameworks that can characterize such borderline social phenomena. We discuss the pros and cons of ascribing some form of quasi-social agency to LLMs and the possibility that future LLMs might be junior participants in asymmetric joint actions.

INTERACTIONS WITH LLMs, OR OTHER RECENT AND EMERGING AI SYSTEMS, ARE, OR CAN BE, QUASI-SOCIAL

- drawing on the human agent's social skills and attributions, that isn't just entirely fictional or pointless
- machine partner can be an entity that rightly draws social reactions and attributions in virtue of having features that make such reactions and attributions more than just metaphorically apt

The Terra Incognita – the INBETWEEN



Artist: Moritz Strasser

A gradual approach

mere tool-use

quasi-social
human-animal
interaction

social adult-adult
interaction



quasi-social
human-machine
interaction

[junior partner]

- lifted or scaffolded into complex joint action by the engagement & structuring of the more knowledgeable partner

quasi-social adult-
infant interaction

[senior partner]

- knows that they know what the other knows
- fully appreciates the social structure of the interaction they are having

SINGLE-SIDED SOCIALITY

- sociality tossed into a void
- application of social skills
- reactions toward entities who are in no respect social partners, with no capacity for social uptake

QUASI-SOCIALITY

- machines designed in a way that exploits the fact that you will react to it as a social agent; and you, in turn, can exploit that fact about it

FULL-BLOWN, INTELLECTUALLY DEMANDING, COOPERATIVE SOCIAL INTERACTION

- both partners make second-order mental state attributions and satisfy various other conditions are required for full-blown adult human cooperative action

ASYMMETRIC SOCIALITY

QUASI-SOCIAL

- premature infants might respond to a soothing touch or sound
← without being ready for anything like full-fledged joint action
- letting a pet snake climb on you might be only quasi-social
← pet snake might only in some minimal sense recognize that you are another entity with which it is interacting

SORTA SOCIAL

- adult & child joint actions
← child brings a lot of social understanding, even if the parent brings more
- snuggling with a cat

QUASI-SOCIAL INTERACTIONS ARE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN A FULLY SOCIAL AGENT AND SOME PARTNER – WHETHER HUMAN, MACHINE, OR ANIMAL – THAT IS NOT COGNITIVELY CAPABLE OF FULL-FLEDGED SOCIAL JOINT ACTION BUT THAT DOES RESPOND IN A WAY THAT PRODUCTIVELY INVITES FURTHER SOCIAL RESPONSES FROM THE SOCIAL PARTNER.

Asymmetric joint actions

conditions for
the junior
partner



**ASYMMETRIC
MINIMAL JOINT
ACTIONS**

MINIMAL
AGENCY

**MINIMAL
COORDINATION**

anticipation: minimal mindreading

minimal sense of commitment

exchanging social information

sharing a world model

Tool kit 'minimal approaches'



How to conceptualize phenomena in the field of developmental psychology & animal cognition that fall through the sophisticated conceptual net of philosophy

- ❖ questioning the necessity of far too demanding conditions
- ❖ considering multiple realizations of capacities that seemed to be restricted to sophisticated adult humans



Moving from the two-dimensional space to the three-dimensional space

increasing
INDISTINGUISHABILITY
between machine-
generated & human-
created text

LLMs live **NOT**
in our social, physical
world

LLMs are not
embodied

But they may play a role in our
world of language games.

explore the to-be-expected
implications of the experience that
our sociality gains traction within
communicative exchanges in HRI



**IN-
DISTINGUISH
-ABILITY**

- so far we can easily distinguish humans from robots

EMBODIMENT

- cause changes in our physical world

**SHARING
WORLD
MODELS**

- ?

All this would not have been possible if I had not interacted with people & machines



Daniel
Dennett



Eric
Schwitzgebel



Mathew
Crosby



David
Schwitzgebel



Mike
Wilby



DigiDan

In case you want to order Anna's AI Anthology



Thank you!

A HUMAN-MADE BOOK IN THE AGE OF MACHINE-GENERATED TEXTS



Anna's AI Anthology
How to live with smart machines?

MoMo berlin International Institute for Philosophy 9

MADE BY HUMANS

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BERLIN

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