# EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHOLOGY
## RIJEKA, CROATIA, 10TH – 13TH SEPTEMBER 2018

**MEMORY SLICES**

# TRANSFORMING THE SELF

L.A. Paul (Yale University)

- **no beforehand knowledge → experiences needed → new knowledge**

**BEING A VAMPIRE**

**TASTE**

**SEEING COLORS**

**HAVING A BABY**

**How do we take decisions about things we never had experienced?**

**NATURE OF TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE**

- going to war, being spiritually reborn, betraying your lover, emigrating to a new country
- replace your old self with a new self → restructure the nature and meaning of your life

**epistemic structure of the self-change**

→ special ways of how new experiences form and change us

- how we use them to construct our lives
- how this relates to how we make life choices

http://www.lapaul.org/index.html

# SYMPOSIUM ON AGENCY, NORMATIVITY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF

→→ problem of other minds

**COGITO ERGO SUM**

*Western philosophy of mind*

**TOWARDS OTHERS**

- Nietzsche: *"We do not know that we need to posit a thinker for thinking."*

- Hegel: *"Only be recognizing another consciousness that we become self-awareness as consciousness."*

- Satre: *"The person is presented to consciousness in so far as the an object for the others."*

**NIETZSCHE**

**HEGEL**

**SATRE**

1. our understanding of ourselves as having conscious minds is the result of meeting other minds
2. perspective is central
3. role of intentions in action +
   take other perspectives on our actions

**Heidi Malbom**
**University of Cincinnati**

# CO-COGNITION AND SOCIAL DISCOURSE

Mattia Gallotti (LSE)

- new avenues of knowledge & experience:

  seeing things 'together' and acting upon shared representations

"Alignment in Social Interactions"

(with Merle Fairhurst and Chris Frith), *Consciousness and Cognition*, 48 (2017): 253-261.

- social interaction → alignment = transformation

*Jane Heal (2013). Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism,*

*Second Person Authority.* Mind, (122) 486, p. 339–371.

CO-COGNITION

- social dimension of self & fundamental aspects of mentality & agency

- transformative nature: 'affordances' of social interactions enable individuals to do more things

ALIGNING MINDS & BODIES IN INTERACTION→ EXPANDING PERSPECTIVE

Highlights

- A new approach to social cognition in terms of mental alignment is proposed.

- The dynamic and graded exchange of information between agents creates alignment.

- Not all forms of joint action in which the agents align will turn out to be social interactions.

- Shared goals are not needed for mutual alignment to occur.

- Two important theoretical developments follow from focusing on processes of mental alignment.

# MORAL TRANSFORMATION AT MULTI-DAY MASS GATHERINGS

*Daniel Yudkin (Yale University), Annayah Prosser (Yale University) and Molly Crockett (Yale University)*

- change moral values = "transformative experiences"

- transformative experiences involving participants of so-called "transformational" mass gatherings

- → significant changes across a range of **behavioral and attitudinal measures:**
  - SOCIAL INCLUSIVITY, MORAL EVALUATION, CONNECTEDNESS TO OTHERS, GENEROSITY
  - INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO THE "WARM GLOW" OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN MORAL JUDGMENT..

burning man

Daniel Yudkin

# HOW IDEOLOGICAL IS PREJUDICE RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

Recent work on social injustice has focused on implicit bias as an important factor in explaining persistent injustice in spite of achievements on civil rights. In this paper, I argue that because of its individualism, implicit bias explanation, taken alone, is inadequate to explain ongoing injustice; and, more importantly, it fails to call attention to what is morally at stake. An adequate account of how implicit bias functions must situate it within a broader theory of social structures and structural injustice; changing structures is often a precondition for changing patterns of thought and action and is certainly required for durable change.

Baston, René
Heinrich-Heine University

**It is not enough to change the individuals' prejudices in order to change social structures Haslanger's argument has to be handled very carefully in order to avoid a fallacy.**

I.      IF prejudice → THEN discrimination   **BUT antecedence can be false**

- reducing prejudices of individuals (micro-level) does not guarantee an overall improvement for a social group (macro-level)

II.     IF procedure X → THEN prejudice –reduction (attitude change) BUT NOT ONLY

- different effects of prejudices reduction strategies result in empathy & cooperative behavior

# ACCESSIBILITY, IMPLICIT BIAS, AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

**beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism**

- implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification

- empirical evidence: we typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes & their impact on our beliefs and behavior, BUT we do have access to their content.

## RESCUE ACCESSIBILISM

- wide accessibilism or differ between facts and how things are???
- both strategies fail

  BUT → epistemic obligations and intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification

**Toribio, Josefa**
University of Barcelona

# PROCEDURAL METACOGNITION IN INTENTIONAL OMISSIONS

## PROCEDURAL METACOGNITION = NECESSARY CONDITION OF AN INTENTIONAL OMISSION

- a kind of recognition of the possibility of action that is left undone

- mental or physical effort are too strong conditions for intentional omission whereas mere guidance control is too weak

  - some mental activity is needed for an omission to count as intentional

    most minimal sense → procedural metacognition → agent perceives possibility of their own action in the horizon of future actions

    without this metacognitive component one cannot intentionally try not to do some action

### PRACTICAL CAPACITY TO MONITOR AND CONTROL ONE'S OWN COGNITIVE ACTIVITY



Kärki, Kaisa
University of Jyväskylä

# THE CHAINS OF HABIT: REPEATED COORDINATION IN JOINT DECISION-MAKING ELICITS A SENSE OF COMMITMENT

COORDINATION:= process whereby one agent adopts her movements & decisions to the movement & decisions at least of one other agent (emergent versus planned)

- **prosocial effects of coordination -** cognitive & motivational mechanisms support cooperation

*Roberts' (2005) 'interdependence hypothesis'*

Michael, John Warwick

- IF interdependence hypothesis correct → THEN repeated coordination → boost cooperation

NOT **trust** BUT **repeated coordination** serve as a cue to participants that their partner is interdependent with them

paradigm: repeated joint decision-making task with same or different partner (Partner vs Stranger Condition)

- coordination was rewarded / temptations were offered

result

**ONLY REPEATED COORDINATION WITH A PARTNER INCREASED ABILITY TO RESIST TEMPTING ALTERNATIVES**

# SUBJECTIVE TIME PERCEPTION AND EPISODIC FUTURE THINKING IN CHILDREN'S DELAY OF GRATIFICATION

**INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE TASKS:** SHORT TERM BENEFIT VERSUS A LARGER, LONG TERM REWARD

- early childhood: preference for immediate gratification

individual differences in children's delay of gratification

Patrick Burns

1. hypothesis of Boyer (2008): **episodic cognition**
   → decision making, manipulations promote episodic future thinking reduce discount rates in intertemporal choice tasks

2. individual differences in how far away the future feels may explain variability in the discounting of future rewards (Kim & Zauberman, 2009; 2013)
   **exponential decay model, NO hyperbolic model** → account for discount rates calculated over subjective time.

*STUDY: relationship between subjective time perception, episodic future thinking, discounting real & hypothetical rewards*
*7-to-9-year-olds (N = 132)*

- children's discounting of delayed rewards → hyperbolic discount function

- applied subjective time estimates → exponential decay model
  limited variability in children's episodic future thinking / only weakly related to delay of gratification
  time perception → critical factor in accounting for departures from normative decision making

**CHILDREN DISCOUNT FUTURE REWARDS HYPERBOLICALLY**

Patrick Burns, Teresa McCormack, Patrick O'Connor and Cristina Atance

# *FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS IN GREAT APES*

Sonja J. Ebel

- *experience enhances problem-solving performance BUT a change in the structure of the problem may require overcoming past experience*

**"functional fixedness effect"**:  humans struggle to use objects in unfamiliar functional contexts since they habitually use them for specific purposes only

- What about our closest living relatives, are nonhuman great apes vulnerable to this effect as well.?

1. experience with the brush-end of a tool (i.e., dipping juice from a container) or not *test:* dipping option was blocked→ use same tool to puncture a hole to access the juice

    > **1:** prior experience shaped apes' manipulation style

2. experience with a hose (i.e., drinking juice from a container) or not *test:* apes were presented with a horizontal tube with blockages close to both openings that required selecting the flexible hose to poke out the food reward.

    > **2:** apes who had not experienced the bread stick as a food item before were more likely to use it as a tool

3. fed with bread sticks or no bread sticks at all. *test:* use bread stick to rake-in grapes.

    > **3:** prior experience performed worse in the test than apes without such experience with regard to success and latency

**NONHUMAN GREAT APES, LIKE HUMANS, ARE VULNERABLE TO THE FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS EFFECT.**

Sonja J. Ebel, Christoph J. Völter and Josep Call

# *REFLECTIVE PERCEPTION AND THE SUBTRACTION ARGUMENT*

- CAPACITY OF REFLECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF ONE'S PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE IS AN INSEPARABLE ASPECT OF THE CAPACITY FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE ITSELF (MCDOWELL 2011)

Johannes Roessler:

**subtraction argument.** (1) Young children have the capacity to acquire perceptual knowledge of objects around them. (2) Young children lack the capacity to reflect on the source of their perceptual knowledge. (3) So the human capacity for perceptual knowledge is not inherently reflective.

## GUILTY OF EQUIVOCATION

- *rudimentary* capacity → perceptual knowledge + lack a *fully developed* understanding of the source of knowledge THEN (1) & (2) lend no support to (3). The argument only goes through if the premises are read as saying that children have a fully developed capacity for perceptual knowledge, and lack even a rudimentary grasp of the source of such knowledge. On that reading, both premises are wrong. I think the two main questions that defenders of this line of response need to address are these: (a) in what sense is young children's capacity for perceptual knowledge limited or rudimentary? (b) How is that sense related to well-documented limitations in their reflective understanding of the source of perceptual knowledge?

- suggestion: using perception to gain propositional knowledge NOT = perception causing certain kinds of subpersonal representations

- early understanding of the enabling condition of perceptual knowledge and some facility for expressing and sharing such knowledge,. Consideration of the developmental evidence, I argue, supports a nuanced reading of (1) and (2).

- acting for reasons … pro tanto reasons

# OLYMPIANS AND VAMPIRES –
## TALENT, PRACTICE, AND WHY "MORTALS" DON'T GET IT

**HOW TALENT AND PRACTICE INTERTWINE**

physical / mental/psychological / **TALENT** / **INNATE?** **+** **PRACTICE** **=** **CHAMPION**

Buccella, Alessandra
University of Pittsburgh

- folk conception is over-simplistic & neglects an important aspect

- It is not additive! + difference between being a champion and being an averagely skilled sports amateur is NOT quantitative **BUT qualitative**

- being a professional includes what Laurie Paul (2014) calls a "transformative experience"

# MESHED CONTROL IN SKILLED ACTION

INTERFACE PROBLEM:
intention & motor representation represent action outcomes but differ in format

SKILLS are not largely automatic →EXPLAIN
flexibility, cognitive control & context-sensitivity ...

intention

propositional format

motor represen tation

motor format

**MYLOPOPOUS & PACHERIE**

intention

propositional format

motor format

**SHEPARD**

**can explain fine-grained intentional control**

strategic control

situation control

WM-based motor control

**MESH MODEL**

low order motor processes

Christensen, Wayne Warwick

❖ **model-based representational format**
     **→ online control**
❖ **representations of causal relation**
     **→ integrated motor & task controls**

# FRAMING, RATIONALITY, AND SELF-CONTROL

**FRAME-SENSITIVE REASONING CAN BE RATIONAL –**

**SEEING THE WORLD IN CONFLICTING FRAMES IS NOT INTRINSICALLY IRRATIONAL**

José Luis Bermúdez
Texas A&M University

classical paradigm: frame-dependent reasoning = irrational **BUT this ignores interesting situations**

→ belief reports & modal context ... so-called intensional contexts → ultra-intensionality

→ you can prefer one frame to another even though you know both frames are identical
*(like Agamemnon has two ways how to frame the death of his daughter)*

*Agamemnon infuriated Artemis →
ships could not sail → sacrificed
his daughter Iphigenie*

- similarities / emotional engagement ...

Principal claims

(1) It can be rational to have quasi-cyclical preferences that are sensitive to how outcomes are framed.

(2) Such quasi-cyclical preferences can be a mechanism for achieving self-control

(3) The model of self-control presented is supported by evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience

Hyperbolic Discounting

PARADIGM CASE OF SELF-CONTROL:
SS = short-term award (*smaller sooner*)
LL= long-term benefit (*larger later*)
V: value/ utility assigned at time t

LL

$v(ss, t2)$ ———————————  SS

$v(LL, t2)$ ———————————

$v(LL, t1)$
$v(ss, t1)$

$t_1$          $t_2$

Decision Maker's Position in Time

# NORM CONFLICTS & CONDITIONALS

**Niels Skovgaard Olsen**
University of Göttingen

competing norms: classical logic vs. non-monotonic logic, probability theory vs. ranking theory

- Psychology of Reasoning should first be purely descriptive and then normative

- *experimental paradigm:*

  multiple norms → conflicting verdicts whether the performance of the participants is correct/incorrect

  →conceptual distinction between directive, appraising, and evaluative uses of a formal system

**Suppositional Theory of Conditionals (S)** VERSUS **Inferentialism (I)**

AND–TO–IF INFERENCES DIAGNOSTIC → DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE S & I



- *profiles of participants*: individual variation in interpretation of indicative conditionals

- *uncertain and-to-if inference task:* extent to which participants that are classified according to different

  interpretations of conditionals are capable of reasoning correctly according to the given profile

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORMATIVE **&** DESCRIPTIVE ASPECTS BY MEASURING NORMS AS PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES

# PRAGMATIC PERSUASION

social psychology: persuasion = communication

BUT communicative aspects of the dynamics of persuasion are neglected

→ pragmatic perspective: account for recipient's inferenceS of why information is communicated

conversational logic:

- communicated information comes with a "guarantee of relevance" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986)
- relevance for the purpose of the communication (Grice, 1975)

→ recipients expect presented information to hold potentially persuasive implications

- expect persuasive communication to convey information that is relevant → infer arguments in favor of the persuasion goal from the presented information.
- simply being presented as part of a persuasive message can make information persuasive

**PRAGMATICS–BASED APPROACH TO INFERENCE IN PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION**

**Michaela Wänke**
Manheim University

# COGNITIVE SUCCESS

**Gerhard Schurz**
Düsseldorf University

RATIONALITY OF SYSTEMS OF REASONING SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF COGNITIVE SUCCESS

- not in terms of normative standards that are based on a priori intuitions →? instrumental rationality

Cognitive success :=

- ecological validity (*system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable*)
- system's applicability (*scope of conditions under which it can be applied*)



Ecol. validity ordering: Q > P > Z > QC
Applicability ordering: Q < P < Z < QC
Success ordering: Q < P < Z > QC

- prominent systems of reasoning perform rather differently on these two factors
  - COMPARE: DEDUCTIVE REASONING, BAYESIAN REASONING, UNCERTAIN CONDITIONALS

- conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive and the normative in psychology & philosophy

**MODEL OF COGNITIVE SUCCESS THAT COMBINES ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY & APPLICABILITY**

# ACTION UNDERSTANDING AS MINDREADING

**Brozzo, Chiara**
University of Tübingen

**Does understanding others' actions involves mindreading?**

I.  NOT MINDREADING: mere outcome identification – teleological stance:

*interpret actions as goal-directed*

II. FULL-BLOWN MINDREADING: intention ascription - prior mental states are hypothesized

intention: world-to-mind direction + normative constraints → high cognitive demands

III. MINIMAL MINDREADING: **proto-intentions + local normative constraints /proto desires ascription + very local normative constraints**

examples: *unwilling vs. unable (9month) /failed attempts /unusual action with or without reason ( → infants & chimps)*

| Butterfill & Apperly | Brozzo |
|---|---|
| relations | outcomes |
| only ascribing to others | proto-intentions / proto-desires one may have + ascribes |

Can the science of action illuminate the philosophy of action, and, if so, how? It may be thought that the two do not (or, even, should not) interact at all.

Krisztina Orbán
University of Tübingen

# THE KNOWLEDGE QUESTION

1ST PERSON REFERENCE → ETHOLOGICAL & DEVELOPMENTAL PHENOMENON OF SELF-DIRECTED ACTION

| proper names<br>– other representation | I<br>– self representation |
|---|---|
| ignorant about whom / what I am referring | must know the reference |

(1)  dedicated information link

- self-reflexive information channels

- cannot be empty / cannot be the wrong one

*"guaranteed right reference cannot be satisfied for all uses of I"*

(2)  self-reflexive control link

- self-directed action

(3)  specific brain areas

(4)  typically attenuated relative to object-related processing

Can the science of action illuminate the philosophy of action, and, if so, how? It may be thought that the two do not (or, even, should not) interact at all.

# PERSONAL AND SUB-PERSONAL

**Hong Yu Wong**
University of Tübingen

**theoretical defense HOW science of action can contribute to philosophy of action**

**ISOLATIONISM / ELIMINATIVIM a false dilemma**

map personal/sub-personal explanations

autonomy of both levels

Isolationism        Eliminativism

To get consciousness in view,
we cannot leave the personal level

**EMPIRICALLY INFORMED PHILOSOPHY OF MIND**

WHAT WHEN WHETHER