



HUSSERL & COMMUNITY CFS WORKSHOP

Memory slices by Anna Strasser

**DISCLAIMER: JUST MEMORIES – AIMING FOR CORRESPONDENCE
WITH REALITY BUT CANNOT GUARANTEE IT.**

PROGRAM

Sara Heinämaa (University of Jyväskylä):

Vocational Communities - the Husserlian Paradigm

Patricia Meindl (University of Copenhagen) & Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen/University of Oxford):

Mutual Address and Communicative Connectedness

Sophie Loidolt (Technical University Darmstadt):

Politicizing Husserl's Transcendental Writings on Community

Thomas Szanto (University of Copenhagen):

Recognizing the Imagined Community. A Critical Reappraisal of Husserl and Stein on the State

Molly McGrath (Assumption University):

The Husserlian Account of Culture and Cultural Appropriation

Genki Uemura (Okayama University):

Husserl on Community as a Subject of Knowledge

Alessandro Salice (University College Cork):

Husserl on the Spiritual World, Shared Intentionality, and Normativity

Hanne Jacobs (Tilburg University):

Do you see what I see? On Joint Attention under Non-ideal Conditions

Emanuele Caminada (KU Leuven):

Plural Habits: The Multipolar Structure of Common Mind

John Drummond (Fordham University):

Community: A Unified Disunity?

VOCATIONAL COMMUNITIES

THE HUSSERLIAN PARADIGM

occasions \leftrightarrow identity

1. practical sense of scissors (cutting tool)
2. reinstitutions
 - forms of communal life (habituation)
 - vocational communities

volitional grounds of occasions

- emotive aspects
 - personal values regulate occasions \rightarrow willing binds us to future actions
 - communal will has to contain consciousness of capacities \rightarrow real possibilities

habituation | personal will | communal will



MUTUAL ADDRESS & COMMUNICATIVE CONNECTEDNESS

DEFENDING HUSSERL AGAINST STAWARSKA (2009). BETWEEN YOU AND I: DIALOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

I. Husserl's concern with communication & I though relation (contra Stawarska's critic)

→ significance of the 2nd person & importance of interaction & communication for the constitution of community

- communication = crucial for the constitution
 - of an objective world (Hua 29, 682)
 - of sociality (Hua15, 475)
- personal self has its origin in acts of communication (Hua 14, 170f.)
 - specific kind of intersubjective connectedness arising in & through communicative acts, which is prior to any proper we (persists even in cases of conflict)

→ emergence of a we-perspective to the communicative I-though relation

→ not every I-though relation is already a we

II. remaining disagreements

Stawarska:

speaking I is inseparable from the you being spoken to

- 1st & 2nd person are entangled with each other from the start (despite their distinctiveness)

Husserl disagrees and sides with



Rabbi Menachem Mendel Morgensztern of Kotzk
(1787-1859)

If I am I, because you are you,
and you are you, because I am I,
then I am not I, and you are not you.
But if I am I because I am I,
and you are you because you are you,
then I am I and you are you,
and we can talk.



POLITICIZING HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL WRITINGS ON COMMUNITY

WHY IS THERE NOT MUCH ABOUT THE PUBLIC REALM PHENOMENOLOGY IN HUSSERL?

classic approaches regarding public realm phenomenology

- Arendt, Sartre, Fanon, Goffman, Plessner, Butler, Alcoff, Honneth

relevant phenomenological constituents / features of public space of meaning

- *general*: visibility, access, attention, relevance, (common) reality
- *political*: common action & participation, recognition, struggle, reflective judgment (sensus communis)



DYNAMICS & TENDENCIES IN HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF COMMUNITIES

EXPANSION

home → alien, 'ur' → 'all'

→ expansion through communication

POLITICIZING SOME FEATURES CONCERNING THE PUBLIC REALM IN HUSSERL

- 'bürgerl. Normalwelt' & 'outsider' (visibility? / access??)
- practical intertwinedness
- property & common good

UNIFICATION

naturally grown → normatively unified, communication → will, open → closed

→ rather paradigm of unification of wills toward a "higher person" than to a community of judges/taste etc. (with different tastes)

- community of communication + will to truth & flourishing
- mediated communities (newspaper)
- *Gemeinwelt, gemeinsames Weltbild* (common relation to the world as 'Lebensumwelt')
- practical intertwinedness
- property & common good

TRUTH

relative → universal

→ specific situations and styles in a bigger form of "universal situation and style" (e.g. German, European "Umwelt" 191);
→ all include truths and errors
→ community of justification (philosophy & science)
→ European "Urstiftung" but universalizable
→ possible conflict? (understanding and critique)

'my place from which I view the world (situated truth that is modifiable):
• understanding / empathy and/or critique

RECOGNIZING THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY

A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF HUSSERL & STEIN ON THE STATE

STANDARD (WEBERIAN) DEFINITION OF STATE

- institutionalization
- territorialization
- sovereignty
- legitimacy

HUSSERL & STEIN FOCUS ON

- **social ontology** of social unit constituting & controlled by state
- **constitutive nature** of sovereignty & legitimacy

Husserl:

- vacillation between quasi-naturalistic 'State-Folk' (Staatsvolk) Theory & volitional constitution (reciprocal willing)

Stein:

- Equivalence thesis of statehood & sovereignty
- going above & beyond state as 'either' founded on natural community 'or' being artificial (volitional) association a la contractualism



STATEHOOD IS NOT REDUCIBLE TO NATURAL OR VOLITIONAL PROCESSES

- PARTLY 'IMAGINED COMMUNITIES'

future research questions:

WHO IS THE 'WE'

- who imagines 'us'?
- who institutes norms of collective imagination?
- Can 'we' decide that on 'our own'?

TOWARDS A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE IMAGINATION

- guided by intra-group norms
 - imagistic, representational traditions
 - adequate representation of 'us'
 - adequate symbolic props
 - included vs. excluded from the shared imaginative project

PROCESS OF CONSTITUTION OF STATE

- ongoing deliberation on norms of collective imagination within imagined community
- recognition by third parties
 - recognized by 'us' & third parties

THE HUSSERLIAN ACCOUNT OF CULTURE & CULTURAL APPROPRIATION


CULTURAL APPROPRIATION:

wrongful taking when cultural outsiders use cultural formations from another cultural group

(a) injustice between the groups

(b) member of the more powerful or historically guilty group taking from the weaker or historically wronged group

How would this make a difference if the taking wasn't wrong in the first place?



PROPERTY

Lockean (Marxian)

- intrinsic relation between thing owned & owner

Conventionalist account

- custom: social/cultural rules how human beings relate to each other about things

CULTURAL APPROPRIATION ACCUSATIONS AS PROPERTY-CLAIMS

- people, by virtue of their membership in the creating group, have exclusive use
- cultural formations are socially produced

HUSSERL: CULTURE - REALM OF SHARED MEANING-EXPRESSED

(a) Expressive Body, Empathy, Sedimentation, Influence

- influencing each other, implicitly endorsing certain things as true, valuable, to be done, supplying norms of action, etc.

(b) Passive, Anonymous, Fluid

- undermines ability to identify creators/owners

(c) More a Heap than a Whole, More an Us than a We

- borders are fuzzy (not geographically or politically), vague membership: an "us" of all those who have received the relevant cultural formations

→ CULTURE

- interpersonal appropriation of meaning
- forms personal identity

ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE WRONGS

property paradigm misframes the issue

→ demand for respect & objection to disrespect, using culture as proxy for the persons behind it:

Disrespectful Depictions | Violations of the Sacred | Destruction of Group-Referential Meaning

FINAL HYPOTHESIS: POST-COLONIAL THEORY & SACREDNESS

All depictions by outsiders may risk seeming disrespectful. All distinctive cultural formations may become signals for group membership and become untouchable by outsiders.

HUSSERL ON COMMUNITY AS A SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

HUSSERL HAS SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT KNOWLEDGE-SHARING.

TRILEMMA

- 1) Some communities are subjects of **knowledge**.
- 2) Any subject of **knowledge** possesses phenomenal consciousness *per se*.
- 3) No community possesses phenomenal consciousness *per se*.

Dissolving the trilemma by disambiguating knowledge in it.

TWO KINDS OF KNOWING (Hua XVIII, 28-29)

- Knowing1:** Cognizing, i.e., self-evident act of judging.
Knowing2: An act of knowing that I report by saying
"I know that the Pythagorean theorem is true but have forgotten the proof."

NON-INTUITIVE JUSTIFICATION BY HABITUAL JUSTIFICATION

If I have proven that p, I have habitual justification (habituelle Rechtmäßigkeit) to judge that p without remembering that p.
e.g. testimonial justification (Averchi 2018, 2021)

COMMUNITIES & INTERSUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION

INTERSUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION IN COMMUNICATION

S_1 's act of communicating that p addressed to S_2 , if successful, motivates S_2 to judge that p.
(unless S_1 is not trustworthy for S_2)

SIMPLE ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE-SHARING

We, as a communicative community C, *know2* that p just in case

- a) there is a member, S_C , of C
- b) S_C has an act, K_p , of *knowing2* that p
- c) there is an intersubjective motivational nexus, N, such that $N = C$ and N includes K_p .

THE WE:=

MY KNOWING2 THAT P+MY TELLING YOU THAT P+YOUR RECEIVING MY MESSAGE.



HUSSERL ON THE SPIRITUAL WORLD, SHARED INTENTIONALITY, AND NORMATIVITY

MAINS CLAIMS

1. There are 2 fundamentally different ways of sharing experiences.

2. There are 2 different kinds of social reasons and of associated normativity,

3. Social normativity should not be conflated with axiological normativity.

HUSSERL ABOUT SOCIAL ACTS

exchange of social (or communicative) acts entail the speaker's

1. WILL that the other leaves the room
2. JUDGMENT that she wants the other to leave the room
3. WILL that the other understands her judgement.

community may not be grounded in communication

- members experience reasons not by creating or being addressed by them
- rather acquire them being confronted with them

you should go to the movies!	you should shave every morning!	you should not torture babies!
<i>directed</i> : the normative demand is hold against somebody	<i>collective</i> : valid for all members of the community	<i>absolute</i> : demand compliance by all (regardless of their group memberships)
<i>only</i> the addressee is entitled to rebuke	<i>all group members</i> is entitled to rebuke	<i>everybody</i> is entitled to rebuke
"why should you go the movie?" "because I promised that (or: because we agreed on that)"	"why should you shave every morning?" "because I am a member of the NY Yankees and this is how we do things"	"why should you not torture babies?" "because that is cruel"
<i>social normativity: grounded in our psychology</i>		<i>axiological normativity: grounded in values</i>

I-though directed structure -dyadic

collective intentionality:

- existence of collective reasons
- capacity to submit oneself to those reasons (often because they make coordination easier)





DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE?

ON JOINT ATTENTION UNDER NON-IDEAL CONDITIONS

DEVELOP AN ACCOUNT OF THE EPISTEMIC DIMENSION OF JOINT ATTENTION

Shaun Gallagher (2020)

- bridging between primary intersubjectivity & secondary intersubjectivity / embodied movements co-constitute the meaning

Felipe Leon (2022)

- attention component: organizing, articulating and shaping our experience of the world (not filtering out information)

joint attention can have a stabilizing effect on socially available distortive ways of experiencing the world

Husserl: JA has an epistemic dimension → possibility of 'joint ignorance': explaining distortive ways of seeing the world

active 'joint ignorance': phenomenon of willful or active ignorance in our non-ideal communities

epistemic dimension of differential power-relations, oppression. & exclusion

- Willful ignorance (e.g., Mills 2007 and 2015; Medina 2013; Dotson 2018)
- Strategic ignorance (e.g., Bailey 2007; Pohlhaus 2011)

- Phenomenological account of racializing habit to account for social situatedness (e.g., Alcoff 2003, Al-Saji 2014 and 2018, Ngo 2016 and 2018)
- Phenomenological account of emotional blindness (e.g., Jardine 2020)
- **Husserlian account of joint attention**: such refusal is social phenomenon of jointly attending to a situation in a certain way – "jointly ignorant"

PLURAL HABITS: THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF COMMON MIND



PLURAL HABITS

Phenomenologically, 'habitus' should to be referred to in the plural: each subject bears a plurality of habits which develop in relation to a plurality of subjects.

GEMEINGEIST

- the plural substrat of habits, that are tracked through the common, resting opinions of the members of the group

(Hua XIV, 200)

relevant for

- ecological → sociological phenomenology
- social structures for constitution of objectivity
- interplay of life, nature & common mind

subsets of Gemeingeist:
plural subject of higher order unified
in love | emotional states | will ...

MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONALITY multi-headed subjectivity

The communal subjectivity is a multi-headed subjectivity, a form of *ego-alteri*. Each communalized *ego* has not only his consciousness, but his consciousness as it is open to the access into the others', and as associated in the multi-headed subjectivity. As such this consciousness is open to the horizons of indeterminacy. (Hua XIV, 218)

BENOIST'S PROVOCATION – the social third?

« Intersubjectivité et socialité : la phénoménologie et la question du tiers »
Phénoménologie et sociologie, Paris, puf, 2001, p. 19–41.

BEGOUT ON HABITUATION

Subjectivity and objectivity of habitude

- Habitudes are not limited to the subjective formation of habitus. They is strongly dependent to their context.
- Trying to accomodate to the environment, habitus are *reproducing* the objective habituality of the world and are *producing* an original synthesis of that structure in a personal habitude which always presents somehow a fluid character.
- In virtue of the intentional correlation of subject and world, habitudes are based on worldly recurrences and habitual schemes. (270ff.)

context & integration of habits

- I am not a 'buntes Subjekt'
- The problem of integration or coordination of habits
- Context collapse

COMMUNITY: A UNIFIED DISUNITY?

HOW CAN COMPASSION LEAD TO A CONCERN IF THERE IS NO PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE?

recognition → differences (+autonomy) - disunity

sympathy & compassion → similarity - unity

sympathy & compassion are intertwined with recognition
→ unified disunity

- Husserl on community
1. social acts of individuals
 2. not reducible to the collection of individual
 3. higher order ..
 4. has its own life
 5. coordination

kinds of social relationships

- partnership
- problems with political communities
 - different understanding of goals
 - LACK OF RESPECT
 - failing of recognize the other as rational agents
 - failing of recognize the other as humans
 - failure of sympathy

